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RASMUSSEN v. SOUTH FLORIDA BLOOD
SERVICE:* THE BALANCE BETWEEN BLOOD,
PRIVACY, AND THE NEED TO KNOW
The United States Supreme Court recognizes the right of an individual to conduct his life in a private manner without unnecessary
intrusion from others.' This individual right of privacy, however,
often directly conflicts with the need of other persons to access information.2 The conflict between an individual's right to confidentiality and another person's need of information is especially apparent
in judicial discovery proceedings.3 The Supreme Court of Florida, in
* 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
1. The United States Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), first recognized that the right to privacy emanates from the United States
Constitution. The Court characterizes this right as man's most complete and most
valuable right. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). The Court's
newest approach to privacy describes the privilege as a fundamental right which unquestionably stems from the concept of ordered liberty. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S.Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986). Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (fundamental liberties viewed as those which are deeply rooted in history and tradition).
Even though there is no express constitutional right to privacy, Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 607-08 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring), it has long been considered a
fundamental right. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. See also Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250 (1891) (one of the first cases recognizing a personal right of privacy).
This fundamental guarantee of personal privacy extends to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
2. In Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2nd Cir. 1973), the United States Court
of Appeals recognized an individual's possession of a reasonable expectation of privacy and freedom from harassment. Id. at 995. Interference with the right of privacy
must be no greater than necessary to support overriding interests. Id. at 995. See U.S.
CONST. amend. I (Congress shall not prohibit free speech); U.S. CONST. amend. V (no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); U.S
CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (privileges and immunities guaranteed to citizens).
Circumstances arise, however, requiring full disclosure of facts in order to obtain
full and fair adjudication on the merits of litigation. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947) (public policy may support reasonable and necessary inquiry into a
person's files and records); Mitsler v. Mancini, 111 I1l. App. 3d 228, 443 N.E.2d 1125
(1983) (discovery justified in order to aid an action pending in another state). In fact,
the very essence of discovery is to supplement the pleadings and to disclose real
points of dispute, thereby creating a sufficient foundation in preparing for trial.4 J.
MOORE, J. LuCAS, & G. GROTHER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02 (2nd ed. 1986)
[hereinafter Moore's Federal Practice].
3. For example, one court dealt with whether a trial court justifiably sanctioned
reporters for failing to disclose confidential sources. Dalitz v. Penthouse, 168 Cal.
App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). The plaintiffs requested the
information in order to ascertain the truth of statements characterizing the plaintiffs
as mobsters. Id. at 472, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 256. Ultimately, the court held the sanctions
constitutional on the grounds that discovery requiring reporters to disclose confidential sources was not overbroad. Id. at 475, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
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Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Services,4 recently addressed
this conflict. The issue in Rasmussen was whether a blood recipient
who contracts Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome5 ("AIDS")
after a series of blood transfusions could obtain the identities of the
blood donors.' The court held that disclosure of material indicating
the dothe names and addresses of blood donors would compromise
7
nors' constitutionally protected privacy interests.
On May 24, 1982, a motor vehicle struck Donald Rasmussen
while he was sitting on a park bench." As a result of his injuries,
Rasmussen was hospitalized for several weeks.' During the course of
his hospitalization, Rasmussen received fifty-one units of blood via
transfusion."0 Subsequently, he was diagnosed as having AIDS and
died of that disease in 1984."
See also Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 654 P.2d 673 (1982)
(the right to privacy versus the need to prove the falsity of information); Mountain
States Tel. v. Dep't of Pub. Serv. Reg., 634 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981) (conflict between
disclosure of public utility's trade secrets and the right to individual privacy).
4. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
5. AIDS is a viral disease which prevents a person's immune system from functioning properly and victimizes the individual with a variety of opportunistic diseases. Johnson, AIDS, 52 MEDIcO-LEGAL J. 3 (1984). It is believed that the virus is
transmitted through the exchange of bodily fluids such as sperm, blood, tears, and
through the use of unsterilized needles. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Pub. Health
Serv., World Health Organization Workshop: Conclusions and Recommendations on
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, reprinted in 253 J.A.M.A. 3385 (1985).
The AIDS virus permeates the T-4 lymphocyte cells which normally stimulate
most of the immune system's disease-fighting mechanisms. Marwick, "Molecular
Level" View Gives Immune System Clues, 253 J.A.M.A. 3371-3375 (1985). Once infected, these cells generate the AIDS virus instead of fighting it. Id. Eventually, a
victim's immunity system becomes so suppressed, that his life may be ended by an
often-treatable illness. Id.
AIDS originated in Africa and primarily strikes homosexual and bisexual men,
intravenous drug abusers, and hemophiliacs. Seligmann, Tracing the Origin of AIDS,
NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1984, at 101.
6. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 534. The first transfusion-associated case transpired in December of 1982. A two-week old infant who was not in a high risk group
received a transfusion for Rh incompatibility and died of AIDS twenty months later.
R. ECKERT & E. WALLACE, SECURING A SAFER BLOOD SUPPLY: Two VIEWS (1985).
As of November 1986, blood-product recipients filed almost 90 liability suits
against blood suppliers, hospitals, physicians, and even a municipality. Mathews &
Neslund, The Initial Impact of AIDS on Public Health Law in the United States1986, 257 J.A.M.A 344, 346 (1987). See also Bosy, Transfusion-Associated AIDS
Suits Arise, AM. MED. NEWS 22 (1986).

7. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535.
8. Id. at 534. The driver of the vehicle was fleeing from a prior motor vehicle
accident. Amended Brief of Petitioner at 3, Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv.,
500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief).
9. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 534.
10. Id.
11. Id. Rasmussen died on June 11, 1984 and a suggestion of death was subsequently filed. South Florida Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 800 n.2 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Id. His estate proceeded with the action. Id. Consequently, Rasmussen's name is used throughout this casenote. See Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 534.
See also Rasmussen, 467 So.2d at 800 n.2
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Before his death, Rasmussen filed a personal injury suit against
the driver of the vehicle.' 2 In an attempt to prove that he had contracted AIDS as a direct consequence of the accident," Rasmussen
served South Florida Blood Service ("South Florida") with a subpoena duces tecum"' seeking the names and addresses of the blood
donors."8 South Florida petitioned the trial court to either quash the
subpoena or to issue a protective order barring disclosure on the
grounds that Rasmussen had not shown good cause or justifiable
reason for the invasion of confidential records.' The court denied
the motion and ordered the blood service to produce the requested
information."' On certiorari, the Third District Court of Appeals
balanced the privacy, institutional, and societal interests involved
and concluded that the order should be quashed.'" The Supreme
12. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 8, at 3.
13. Tort law has established that a tortfeasor may be held liable for the foreseeable complication of injuries which he caused, including negligent medical treatment
of the injuries. W. KEETON, D. DOsBS. R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 309-10 (5th ed. 1984). "Where the injured plaintiff subsequently contracts a
disease.... If the injury renders the plaintiff particularly susceptible to the diseases.
. there is little difficulty in holding the defendant [liable] for the consequences of the
disease and its treatment." Id. at 310.
14. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 534. The subpoena demanded "any and all
records, documents and other material indicating the names and addresses of the
blood donors." Id. This type of subpoena requires a witness to bring to court any
relevant documents that are under the witness' control. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY
(1984).
15. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 534. Rasmussen has neither alleged negligence on
the part of the blood service nor brought South Florida in as a party to the underlying litigation. Id.
16. Id. Perhaps South Florida's adamant efforts to oppose donor identification
stems from a self-motivated interest. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 8, at 9. The potential failure to screen high risk groups from donation and the blood service's inevitable
culpability would never appear if donors identities were totally confidentia and completely nondiscoverable. Id.
17. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 534.
18. Id. The Florida Court of Appeals discussed Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.280 which "allows for discovery of any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
subject matter of the action." Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at 801 (emphasis added). The
court then explained that discovery may be limited or prohibited if it would cause
"annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden of expense." Id. See infra
note 39 and accompanying text.
Next, the court stated that a person objecting to discovery may show good cause
in order to prevent disclosure. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at 801. Then, balancing the
competing interests to be served in granting or denying discovery, establishes whether
or not good cause has been shown. Id. See also Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis,
372 So. 2d 117, 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (proper balancing of the competing
interests will determine whether discovery is appropriate); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 90 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (a family's privacy interest in
its medical records outweighs a manufacturer's need for them).
Finally, the Rasmussen court characterized the competing interests as: 1) the
plaintiff's need to obtain discovery in order to pursue full recovery for his injuries; 2)
the donors' constitutionally based privacy rights to preclude disclosure of personal
matters; and 3) the institutional and public concern in securing a safe and adequate
blood supply. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at 801-04.
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Court of Florida granted review in order to respond to the developing problem of how an individual's personal information is used."
The court decided whether the privacy interests of individuals,
along with societal interests, outweigh a plaintiff's interest in discovering donor information.2 0 The supreme court affirmed the district
court's decision barring disclosure of the requested information in
South Florida's records. 2' The court concluded that disclosure of donor identities would result in more damage than benefit in light of
potential discrimination from co-workers, friends, employers and
others."'
In upholding the district court's decision, the court applied a
balancing test applied in two earlier cases involving discovery in a
medical context.23 These cases properly balanced the competing in19. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 534.
20. Id. at 536. The Rasmussen court reiterated Chief Justice Overton's remarks
at the opening session of Florida's 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission:
"There is public concern about how personal information concerning an individual
citizen is used, whether it be collected by government or by business. The subject of
individual privacy and privacy law is in a developing stage ....

It is a new problem

that should probably be addressed." Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 536 (quoting Address
by Chief Justice Ben Overton, Constitution Revision Commission (July 6, 1977)).
The first major medical report suggesting that AIDS might be transmitted in
blood was published in The New England Journal of Medicine in 1984. Response of
Amicus Curiae Council of Community Blood Centers to Order to Show Cause Why
Petition for Certiorari Should Not Be Granted, South Florida Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
The report recognized that there were a significant number of people with AIDS
who did not belong to any of the high risk groups for the disease. 310 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 69 (1985). Many of these people received blood components within five years
before the onset of the illness. Id. This evidence led to the finding that AIDS may be
transmitted through blood and blood transfusions. Id.
21. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 534.
22. Id. at 537. The Florida Supreme Court stated:
The threat posed by the disclosure of the donors' identities goes beyond the
immediate discomfort occasioned by third party probing into sensitive areas of
the donors' lives. Disclosure of donor identities in any context involving AIDS
could be extremely disruptive and devastating to the donor. If the requested
information is released, and petitioner queries the donors' friends and fellow
employees, it will be functionally impossible to prevent occasional reference to
AIDS.
Id.
23. The Supreme Court of Florida dealt with a hospital's challenge to an order
which required it to answer an interrogatory concerning the contents of its admission
records of patients. North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, 397 So. 2d
1033 (Fla. 1981). The patients were not involved in the underlying action which the
hospital brought against an insurer for misrepresenting the financial status of a certain patient. Id. at 1034. The hospital objected to the interrogatory on the basis of
oppressiveness and irrelevance. Id. The court reasoned that the expenditure of time
and money necessary to carry out the order would be burdensome and oppressive and
could not be justified absent a showing of clear necessity. Id. at 1035.
Likewise, the District Court of Appeal of Florida dealt with whether a medical
association should be required to produce records of its Ethics Committee, which concerned two physicians, in order for respondent to go forward with his underlying personal injury case. Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So.2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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terests served in granting or denying discovery.24 Furthermore, the
court recognized that the possible breach of confidentiality and society's interest in efficient medical treatment outweighed a plaintiff's
interest in obtaining a patient's medical records.25
Relying on this precedent, the Rasmussen court first examined
the nature and importance of the donors' rights.2 The court stated
that the right of privacy encompasses at least two different kinds of
interests: first, an individual's right to autonomously make certain

kinds of decisions;27 and second, an individual's right to prevent disclosure of personal matters.2". The court did not discuss the right to
make autonomous decisions, but found the latter to be applicable to
the present case.2 9 The court further noted that the Florida State
Constitution independently protects a citizen's right to privacy" by
providing an explicit foundation for those privacy interests which
are not inherent in the concept of ordered liberty.3' The Rasmussen
App. 1979). The medical association produced all records requested except those of
the Ethics Committee. Id. at 118. They protested that those records must remain
confidential in order to achieve the committee's purpose of investigating, discussing,
and considering issues of the professional conduct of its physicians. Id. at 119. The
court rationalized that the potential discouragement of complaints and free discussion concerning the activities of physicians outweighed the chimerical grounds asserted for their discovery. Id. at 121.
24. See generally Tucson Medical Center v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958
(1976) (the overwhelming interest in maintaining confidentiality requires a showing
of necessity to justify disclosure); American Health Plan, Inc. v. Kostner, 367 So. 2d
276 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1979) (the revelation of documents concerning patients who
have no connection with the litigation would compromise their right to
confidentiality).
25. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535. The court placed great weight on the donors'
right to privacy wording the privilege as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized man." Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969) which cited Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
26. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535.
27. Id. See Whalen v. Roej 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
28. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See
generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974) (diminishing the concept of right to privacy and discussing independence and immunity to
governmental regulation).
29. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535. The general right to privacy includes an immensely broad area of personal action and belief. Id. at 536. See, e.g., Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (the right to receive information and ideas is generally
free from governmental intrusion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right to privacy encompasses the right to use contraception); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the right to educate one's children falls under the right
to privacy).
30. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980) provides that "every natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except
as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." Id.
31. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 536. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. I, § 12 (limitations
upon unreasonable search generally protect against invasions of privacy during criminal investigations).
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court then intertwined this right of privacy with the calamitous
problem of AIDS, explaining the stigma of disclosing the blood donors' identities within the same context of this horrid disease.32 The
court recognized that the potential damage to the blood donors' reputations was too great of a consequence to justify discovery."3 The
Rasmussen court further noted that society has a vital interest in
maintaining a healthy blood supply through discouraging any disincentive to volunteer blood donation. 4 The court reasoned that any
inquiry into one's private life and the potential association with
AIDS would deter blood donation." Consequently, denying the discovery of donors' identities upholds society's indispensably vital interest of maintaining a healthy blood supply.
The court analogized Rasmussen's interest in proving a causal
connection between his disease and the motor vehicle accident to
the state's interest in providing full compensation for victims of negligence.36 The potential harm that disclosure of identities would
cause to the reputations and other liberty interests of the fifty-one
donors would, however, compromise their due process rights.37 Accordingly, the harm in permitting disclosure significantly outweighed the probative value of the discovery which Rasmussen
sought.38
32. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 537.
33. Id. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
34. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 537. Rasmussen argued that neither South Florida
Blood Service nor the Council of Community Blood Centers claimed that they had
maintained the confidentiality of donors' identities in the past. Petitioner's Brief,
supra note 8, at 8-9 (citing Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., 368 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App.
1979)). In fact, blood donor confidentiality has not been granted in previous litigation
concerning other diseases acquired during blood transfusions. Id. In support, Rasmussen stated: "If donor names have been supplied in the past by other blood banks,
both in AIDS-related cases and also those concerning malaria and serum hepatitis
without the hypothetical 'chilling' effect on donors, why should we now image such a
threat?" Id. at 9. Rasmussen did not, however, explain that his argument applied to
paid rather than voluntary donors. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
35. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 537. The court explained that the number of donors was decreasing, due to the necessary exclusion of potential donors through
screening and testing, as well as the unnecessary reduction as a result of the fear that
donation itself could transmit the disease. Id. See generally Ehrlichman, Why It's
Safe To Give Blood, PARADE MAG., July 6, 1986, at 12-13 (many Americans believe
that donating blood is dangerous due to the AIDS epidemic).
In 1974, The Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") issued the
National Blood Policy in response to a finding that blood supplies were inadequate
and blood quality was uneven. Brief of Amicus Curiae Council of Community Blood
Centers at 37, Rasmussen v, South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987)
[hereinafter Brief of CCBC].
HEW's policy outlines, inter alia, measures for an all-voluntary blood donor system, assurances for ample donation of blood and plasma, and methods to eliminate
commercialism in the acquisition of blood. National Blood Policy, 39 FED. REG. 32,702
(1974).
36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
37. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 538.
38. The court realized that Rasmussen had a legitimate interest in obtaining
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While the court's reasoning in Rasmussen is very persuasive, it
also contains certain flaws. The court correctly determined that the
rules of civil procedure allow a court to limit or prohibit discovery in
order to protect the privacy of individuals."9 Although the court also
applied a clear balancing test for determining whether a protective
order is suitable in a particular situation, the Constitution mandates
a strict scrutiny analysis which would have enhanced this decision's
precedential value. 40 Nevertheless, the court properly concluded that
the potentially disastrous consequences of disclosure outweighed the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining the requested information. The
court, however, overlooked
the advent of contemporary donor4
screening methods. 1
the information. Id. Its weight was mitigated however, since there was no evidence
that discovery would lead to the establishment of causation. Id.
It is important to note that Rasmussen already had the testimony of the Chief of
the Division of Infectious Diseases at Mt. Sinai Medical Center stating that Rasmussen's AIDS was probably due to the multiple blood transfusions he received in the
hospital. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
39. Rule 26(b) allows for discovery of material that is not privileged. MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2. A sound public policy may outweigh the need for
access to relevant information. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) 26.60[3]. Consequently, discovery may be disallowed if it would create an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Id.
See also New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 22 FED. R. SERv. 2d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(construing FED. R. Civ. P. 26 to conclude that discovery of personnel files disallowed
since it would discourage future candid communication); Reed v. Smith Barney, 50
F.R.D. 128 (S.D.N.Y. -1970) (construing FED. R. Civ. P. 26 to prohibit discovery of
broker's files containing names and describing transactions of clients where it would
invade private dealings of non-litigants).
In the District Court of Appeals, Judge Schwartz in his dissent argued that the
majority based its decision upon unsupported public policy. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at
805. He asserted that revelation of the donors' identities to the blood bank in the first
place constituted a waiver of any privilege concerning the information. Id. He also
stated that no adverse effects of disclosure have occurred in the past and that in the
event of unfavorable consequences, it would then be time for the court to step in. Id.
at 806.
Judge Schwartz failed to realize that if judicial intervention was necessary, it
would be too late to prevent the disastrous dissemination of the donors' identities.
See Brief of Respondent on the Merits at 23, Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood
Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. In addition, a
party does not waive a privilege in relation to medical records unless he voluntarily
discloses or consents to disclosure of the privileged material. Buffington v. Gillette
Co., 101 F.R.D. 400 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
41. In March of 1985, the Secretary of Health and Human Services granted the
first license to manufacture human T-lymphotropic virus type III/lymphadenopathyassociated virus (HTLV III) antibody test kits to detect exposure to the AIDS virus.
Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liablity Issues Relating to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (1986).
The advent of the serologic test promises to essentially end AIDS transmission in
blood. Brief for CCBC, supra note 35, at 14. According to the Director of the AIDS
Clinic of San Francisco General Hospital, the test will largely eliminate blood transfusions as a source of future AIDS cases. Id. at 15. Prior to this standard screening
test, blood centers employed the best possible methods available to decrease the risk
of AIDS in transfusions. Id. at 13-14. Medically trained interviewers would ask potential blood donors if they had experienced any described symptoms of AIDS. Id. If the
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The Rasmussen court properly reasoned that although the
blood donors' rights of privacy are constitutionally protected,42 the
rules of discovery also protect the societal interests involved.4 3 The
federal rules allow discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."" In
addition, several cases support the proposition that discovery lies in
the discretion of the trial judge,45 and in performing such discretion,
the court will grant the remedy of discovery where the movant
shows need.46 Courts have construed this rule liberally, exercising
broad discretion in granting discovery requests.47 In accordance with
the federal rules, however, the court may limit or prohibit discovery
in order to "protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. '48 Consequently, this
potential donor's answer was positive or "suggestive", then he would be deferred. Id.
Second, the potential donor would be given written information explaining that persons in high risk groups of AIDS victims should refrain from donating blood. Id. The
prospective donor was then free to either leave the blood center without explanation,
or discuss the matter with a professional. Id. If the potential donor was ever deferred,
it was done without further questioning. Id. Excluding possible AIDS carriers was the
main purpose of this process, in addition to maintaining a level of privacy in an individual's personal habits and sexual preferences. Id. The screening procedure effectively filtered out those with the highest risk of AIDS from donating blood. Office of
Technology and Assessment, Blood Policy and Technology, H.R. DOC. NO. 260, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1985).
42. Florida has adopted a-freestanding right to privacy to protect those interests that are inherent in the concept of ordered liberty and which may not be safeguarded by specific constitutional provisions. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 536. Three
other states have adopted similar legislation. See Alaska Const. art. I, § 22 (1972);
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1984); Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 (1972).
Several other states - Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, and
Washington - safeguard privacy to a lesser extent. See Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631, 636-637
(1977).
The Florida Amendment guarantees a right of privacy broader in scope than that
of the Federal Constitution. Winfield v. Div. of Para-Mutuel Wagering, Dept. of Business Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). The amendment was intentionally
phrased in strong terms to make the privacy right as strong as possible. Id. at 548.
43. See supra note 39.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
45. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (due to the current Rules of Civil
Procedure, reliance upon the trial judge is needed in order to prevent abuse of discovery); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (construing FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) to find
that courts should not neglect the power to restrict discovery); Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986 (2nd Cir. 1973) (discovery is within the trial court's discretion).
46. See, e.g., Galella, 487 F.2d at 997 (harassment by photographer justifies the
grant and nature of protection given to plaintiff with respect to discovery); Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 585, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984) (exhaustion
of alternative sources would lead to discovery of newsperson's confidential sources);
GT, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 151 Cal. App. 3d 748, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 892 (where good cause is shown, trial court may prevent disclosure of financial
information).
47. Tele-Radio Systems v. DeForest Electronics, 92 F.R.D. 371 (D.C.N.J. 1981).
See 27 C.J.S. Discovery § 22 (1959).
48. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c) allows a court to protect against any undue invasion
of a person's privacy. Springer v. Greer, 341 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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court's ruling sufficiently protects blood donors from incurring such
problems.

Parties have raised similar privacy claims in opposition to discovery requests in situations involving medical,'" financial,50 admin-

istrative,"1 and legal5 2 information. In each of these situations,
courts have recognized the need to reject disclosure on the grounds
of irrelevancy,51 privilege,' or undue burden55 on the party ordered
to produce the information. The important policy these decisions
have promoted include objectives such as the efficient treatment of
medical patients, 6 the candid and forthright consultation between
client and attorney,"7 and the high quality of hospital care.58 These
decisions recognize that, although discovery is important, the courts
49. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Peralta, 358 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 364 So. 2d 889 (Fla.).
50. Colonies Condominium Ass'n v. Clairview Holdings, Inc., 419 So. 2d 725
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
51. Sherman v. Dist. Court, 637 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1981).
52. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill.2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250
(1982).
53. In Colonies, the court upheld a protective order with respect to financial
records which had relevance to an accounting, but not to the plaintiff's right to an
accounting. Colonies, 419 So. 2d at 762. The court held that a party must show that
he is entitled to an accounting before he is allowed to discover financial records. Id. If
the petitioner cannot meet this burden, then he will not obtain the data even though
the documents are somewhat relevant. Id.
54. In Consolidation,the Supreme Court of Illinois explained that the attorneyclient privilege generally precludes discovery of an attorney's notes and memoranda.
89 Ill.2d at 110, 432 N.E.2d at 253. The burden of obtaining the privilege lies with the
claimant who must show that communication originated in confidence, was made to
an attorney who was acting in a legal capacity, and that the communication remained
confidential. Id. at 119, 432 N.E.2d at 257.
55. In Argonaut, the court reasoned that while the rules of discovery are to be
construed liberally, requiring the petitioner to produce medical records for the past
eleven years was beyond reason. Argonaut, 358 So. 2d at 233.
56. State statutes protect medical information from disclosure in order to prevent embarrassment and to encourage full disclosure. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 14307(a) (1981) (statute protects any information that physician has acquired while administering to a patient); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-802 (1985) (statute applies to
information obtained by a physician attending to any patient in a professional capacity). See also Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill.App.3d 850, 435 N.E.2d 140
(1st Dist. 1982) (patients must be able to disclose information knowing that their
expectation of privacy will be protected). For an extensive commentary on the concepts of confidentiality and privacy and how they relate to medical records, see Winslade, Confidentiality of Medical Records, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 497 (1982).
57. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank
disclosure by securing a cloak of confidentiality, thereby aiding the proper functioning of the adversary system." Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 2, 26.60[2]. See
also Synair Corp. v. Am. Indus. Tire, 645 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (one of the
primary purposes of the attorney-client privilege is to permit consultation in furtherance of achieving a legal defense); Standard Chartered Bank v. Ayala Int'l Holdings,
111 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (disclosure of attorney-client communications allowed
only if benefit outweighs injury to attorney-client relationship).
58. The Supreme Court of Colorado stated that considerations of public policy
may determine the issue of discovery in hospital inspection committes. Sherman, 637
P.2d at 383.
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will prohibit disclosure where it is necessary to do so to advance
indispensable interests. Applying this analysis, the Rasmussen court
properly reasoned that nondisclosure advances the more important
objective of maintaining voluntary blood donations.
In weighing the relevant interests served in granting or denying
discovery, the Rasmussen court properly asserted that federal" and
state 0 constitutions protect a blood donor's right to privacy. The
United States Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut,6 set
forth various fundamental guarantees which create zones of privacy. 2 Because the right to privacy is a fundamental right, any governmental intrusion upon the right is justified only if it is "necessary" to fulfill a "compelling" state interest.63 Governmental
infringement occurs when a state court takes action to encroach
upon an individual's rights absent the requisite compelling or necessary interest.""
59. See supra note 1.
60. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The Florida Amendment was
definitely intended to safeguard the right to ascertain whether sensitive information
about oneself may be disseminated to others. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 536.
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. The Court stated that certain guarantees create various zones of privacy,
stating:
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent
of the owner is another facet of the privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people."
Id. at 484.
The Court then set forth the test for determining a fundamental right: "In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in
light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions
and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so
rooted [there] as to be ranked as fundamental' ". Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
Finally, we are provided with a further analysis of ascertaining such rights: "The
inquiry is whether a right involved 'is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions'." Griswold, 391 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (quoting Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
63. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J.,concurring). "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interst which is compelling." Id. (quoting Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
64. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). "It is doubtless that a State may
act through different agencies, - either by its legislature, its executive, or its judicial
authorities; and the prohibitions of the [fourteenth] amendment extend to all action
of the state denying equal protection of the laws." Id. at 14 (quoting Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880)).
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Thus, the Rasmussen court reasoned that compelling discovery
of the donors' identity constitutes governmental action within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 6 Consequently, Rasmussen
would have had to show a compelling interest in order to justify donor discovery. Although the court did not directly apply this analysis, three reasons support the proposition that Rasmussen would
have failed to meet this strict scrutiny. First, other methods exist in
order to serve his purpose.e Second, it is unnecessary to disclose
donors' identities in the damaging context of AIDS and, therefore,
subject them to ridicule and discrimination.6 7 Third, his interest was
not compelling enough to overcome the consequential decrease in
voluntary blood donations."8
First, the Rasmussen court justifiably recognized the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining full compensation for his injuries.6 9 Nevertheless, alternative methods could enhance these interests at a lesser
cost than discovery without the subsequent invasion of donors'
lives.7 0 For instance, South Florida Blood Service supplied the peti65.

The fourteenth amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. First, Rasmussen already had the testimony of a Center for Disease Control
employee and a physician of Mt. Sinai Hospital that the AIDS was transfusion-related. Respondent's Brief, supra note 39, at 21. Second, Rasmussen should have had
no problem in obtaining one or more experts to testify in the same way. Id.
67. See supra note 22 for a discussion of protecting donors' identity.
68. Rasmussen's need for the information is miniscule. Respondent's Brief,
supra note 39, at 17. Petitioner failed to see that a tortfeasor's liability is not limited
to negligent medical treatment following the initial injury. Id. The original wrongdoer
is responsible for injury which flows from the tortious conduct. Id. Therefore, Rasmussen need not prove negligence in the donation of blood. Id. Furthermore, Rasmussen would not be able to prove that he obtained AIDS from the blood transfusions since it was not until March of 1985 that there was any method available to
detect infectious blood. Id.
69. See supra note 38 for a discussion of the policy of full compensation for
injured plaintiffs. The court incorrectly explained, however, that this interest would
not be advanced if the discovery was allowed. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 538. Discovery would increase Rasmussen's element of causation. Additionally, he would increase
his ability to defeat defenses such as illness from other sources. Petitioner's Brief,
supra note 8, at 5-7.
Nevertheless, Judge Schwartz felt that the court did not give enough weight to
the plaintiff's interest. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at 805. See Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 8, at 6. He explained that the court unfairly considered Rasmussen's claim in
light of the defendant's attempt to prove that Rasmussen's affliction resulted from
intravenous drug abuse or homosexuality. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at 805. Judge
Schwartz stated that it is of absolute necessity to the plaintiff and his survivors that
they obtain the information whether one or more of the donors is a potential carrier
or is a sufferer from AIDS. Id. The judge was concerned that the mere representation
of such an idea would hinder Rasmussen's interest if he did not have supporting
proof. Id.
70. A plaintiff is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a blood
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tioner
with a report that none of the donors is a known AIDS victim. 7 1 This report established prima facie that Rasmussen did not
obtain contaminated blood and that his need for discovery was dubious at best.7 2 Past courts have ruled that the disclosure of personal information is prohibited when the information sought is obtainable from other sources.78 Likewise, the Rasmussen court
observed that implementing another method to verify the Blood
Service's report while maintaining the confidentiality of the donors'
identities is possible. 7' Therefore, a plaintiff's accessibility to information elsewhere precludes the extraneous intrusion into an individual's life.
Second, the court purposefully recognized that there was a serious threat that a plaintiff would conduct an unlimited and extremely disruptive investigation of the donors, beyond the mere discovery of identities, in order to prove aggravation of his injuries. As
the court stated, "the potential for invasion of privacy is inherent in
the litigation process.17

Perhaps the most exigent matter the court

deterred is the defense's persistent interruption and investigation of
a person's life in the underlying litigation.7 6 Moreover, the the policy
behind donor discovery would absolutely terminate an individual's
solitude. The minute the plaintiff's investigation of the donor estabtransfusion was the proximate cause of death. Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes,
214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951). Additionally, a civil action only requires the
finder of fact to believe from the greater weight of evidence that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the negligent act of the defendant. Id. Rasmussen had all the evidence he needed in order to establish this. See supra note 66.
Moreover, courts have recognized negligence as an adequate theory upon which to
base an action to recover for adverse effects from blood transfusions. See Annotation,
Blood Transfusion - Liability, 45 A.L.R.3d 1376 (1972) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be held applicable in these types of cases. Id. at 1379.
71. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 537.
72. Even if Rasmussen could determine that one or more of the donors had
AIDS or was in a high risk group, this evidence has no probative value since it does
not establish that the individual had AIDS and was infectious in 1982 or when he
donated the blood. Respondent's Brief, supra note 39, at 21.
73. See Eastern Auto Distrib., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 96 F.R.D. 147
(E.D. Virg. 1982). See also Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Contor Fitzgerald Sec. Corp.,
91 F.R.D. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (production of material not compelled since plaintiff
failed to present evidence that personal information was not readily obtainable elsewhere); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (compelling need for information established when the data is not otherwise readily obtainable).
74. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 537.
75. Id. at 535.
76. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for inquiry into a person's conduct,
upon cross-examination, in order to establish an individual's reputation or character
trait. FED. R. EvID. 405. In addition, any party may, by way of opinion or reputation,
attack the credibility of a witness. FED. R. EvID. 607, 608. The opportunities provided
to defense counsel would propel him to make the most invading type of inquiries into
a person's life in order to defend his client (i.e., questioning employers, family,
friends, and acquaintances). See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 8, at 7. Moreover, the
defendant below did assert the defense of alternative sources for Rasmussen's disease.
Id. at 6.
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lished the existence of AIDS in that person, the defendant would
then drag the individual through a devastating experience, attempting to establish that his disease did not manifest itself until after the
time of donation.7 7 In addition, everyone affiliated with the donor
would be investigated regarding incredibly private information. The
result would lead to overwhelming consequences for all involved.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that certain hospital records are discoverable, provided they do not "blacken the character of a patient. '" Because donor discovery, in a case such as Rasmussen, would most likely tarnish the reputation of everyone
involved, disclosure should remain prohibited.
Third, the plaintiff's discovery interest was not sufficiently compelling to overcome society's interest in sustaining a healthy donor
program. The Supreme Court held in Nixon v. Administer of General Services 7 9 that balancing the extent of disclosure, the protections against additional disclosure, and the public interest favoring
disclosure determines whether a constitutional invasion of privacy
has occurred.80 The Rasmussen court's realization of society's interest in discouraging disincentive to voluntary blood donation mirrors
the policy set forth in Nixon. In Rasmussen, disclosure would extend beyond a reasonable limit allowing arbitrary investigation into
the donors' lives.81 Moreover, the plaintiff in Rasmussen never
promised protection against additional disclosure, and even if he
had, the blood donors could not be guaranteed that further disclosure would not inadvertently occur. The public interest in maintaining a strong blood supply definitely favors nondisclosure in order to
encourage the voluntary donation of blood to meet the requisite
needs of society. Although donor discovery has previously occurred
in several circumstances, s each situation involved donors who were
paid for their services.8 " Because society is most interested in main77. See supra note 76.
78. In re The June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa.
143, 415 A.2d 73 (Pa. 1980). Accord Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Commonwealth
Dep't of Health, 461 A.2d 329 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (dental records discoverable
since they would not tend to blacken the patient's character); State v. Gotfrey, 598
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979) (patients have an interest in keeping confidential revelations
from public scrutiny).
79. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
80. Id. at 465.
81. See supra note 22.
82. See, e.g., Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., 368 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(court allowed plaintiffs to locate blood donors in order to allege negligent screening
methods); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105
(1977) (unit of blood traced to the donor to establish negligence, strict liability in
tort, and breach of warranty).
83. In Tufaro, the witnesses were commercial donors and were paid five dollars
per unit. Tufaro, 368 So. 2d at 1220. The witnesses gave incredible testimony. Id.
Likewise, in Moore, the individual donated his blood for commercial gain. Moore, 147
N.J. Super. at 253, 371 A.2d at 107. Accord Gilmore v. St. Anthony Hosp., 598 P.2d
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taining a strong voluntary program14 , however, the paid donor cases
are not analogous.
Since the discovery of AIDS, panic and social havoc have dominated the realm of the disease. 5 Discrimination of AIDS victims has
run rampant in several areas such as employment, insurance, and
housing.8 Discrimination upon grounds of "sexual orientation" and
fear of contagion also fuel this panic.8 7 Thus, the desire to punish
the donor who transmitted the AIDS may motivate increased requests for blood donor records. A number of jurisdictions make it a
crime to knowingly or recklessly harm another through viral transmission. 8 While these statutes only apply to venereal diseases, they
do set a precedent of criminal penalties in a public context. Because
a vast number of people do not know their own seropositive status,8 9
they should not be held liable for transmitting contaminated blood
when they voluntarily donate.90 In addition, it would only be a matter of time before this type of legislation was set forth in connection
with transfusion-related AIDS. The Rasmussen court's ruling will
help quash the natural extension of criminal liablity of the individual donor.
In weighing the relevant interests, the Rasmussen court did not
address the availability of a serological test which depicts the presence of AIDS antibodies in donated blood.91 This test has been determined to be 99.8 percent accurate9 2 and would, therefore, alleviate most need for discovery subsequent to the introduction of the
exam. 98 This test, however, could only be effective in avoiding "seri1200 (Okla. 1979) (facts disclosing that blood donor was paid for his contribution).
84. A major goal of the National Blood Policy, initiated by the federal government in 1973, was to establish an all-volunteer blood collection system because commercially collected blood was more likely to be contaminated. Petitioner's Brief,
supra note 8, at 7.
85. See Dreele, AIDS and Public Policy, NAT'L REV., July 8, 1983, at 796.
86. See MATHEWS & NESLUND supra note 6, at 347-49.
87. See Dreele, supra, note 85, at 796.
88. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3198 (West 1979) (illegal to expose
another to infectious diseases); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.02 (West 1986) (unlawful to
have sexual intercourse with the knowledge that one is afflicted with a venereal disease); N.Y. Public Health Law § 2307 (McKinney 1985) (misdemeanor for an individual who is knowingly infected with a contagious disease to have sexual intercourse);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.20 (Purdon 1977) (penalties and prosecutions for violating disease control laws); and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4445 (Vernon 1976) (no
person shall expose another to infection with any venereal disease).
89. See infra note 93.
90. It has been held that blood donors are not liable to donees for transmitting
contaminated blood unless the donor knows or has reason to know of the disease.
Hubbell v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 Misc.2d 847, 260 N.Y.S. 2d 539
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
91. See supra note 41.
92. Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 44.
93. Macklin, Predicting Dangerousness and the Public Health Response to
AIDS, 1986 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (Special Supplement at 20).
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ous disincentive to volunteer blood donation

9

4

if it would alleviate

all need for discovery. The 0.2 percent (or greater) margin leaves the
door wide open for future discovery and serious probing into people's lives which would deter them from giving blood. In fact, the
mere presence of this litigation in the courts will make people think
twice before entering a blood bank. Therefore, because donorscreening methods fail to extinguish all possibility of AIDS transmission, donor discovery cannot be justified.
The most important issue in donor discovery cases is the court's
perspective when approaching problems such as those raised in Rasmussen. A court may view donor discovery from the perspective of
the need for discovery or from the perspective of protecting the interests of society along with an individual's privacy expectations.
The need for discovery approach will erode constitutionally protected interests, as well as provide serious disincentive to volunteer
blood donations. Courts facing the issue in the future must fully
comprehend the Rasmussen court's logic in upholding these respective interests. In essence, acknowlegement of the Rasmussen decision must extend beyond rhetoric in order to establish a strong policy of upholding the most basic and necessary interests known to
mankind.
Joseph A. Durkin

94.

Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 538.

